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Abstract
Randomized classifiers have been shown to pro-
vide a promising approach for achieving cer-
tified robustness against adversarial attacks in
deep learning. However, most existing methods
only leverage Gaussian smoothing noise and only
work for `2 perturbation. We propose a general
framework of adversarial certification with non-
Gaussian noise and for more general types of at-
tacks, from a unified functional optimization per-
spective. Our new framework allows us to identify
a key trade-off between accuracy and robustness
via designing smoothing distributions, helping to
design new families of non-Gaussian smoothing
distributions that work more efficiently for differ-
ent `p settings, including `1, `2 and `∞ attacks.
Our proposed methods achieve better certification
results than previous works and provide a new per-
spective on randomized smoothing certification.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art per-
formance on many tasks such as image classification (He
et al., 2016) and language modeling (Devlin et al., 2019).
Nonetheless, modern deep learning models are highly sensi-
tive to small and adversarially crafted perturbations on the
inputs (Goodfellow et al., 2015), which means that human-
imperceptible changes on inputs could cause the model to
make dramatically different predictions. Although many
robust training algorithms have been developed to overcome
adversarial attacking, most heuristically developed methods
can be shown to be broken by more powerful adversaries
eventually, (e.g., Athalye et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018;
Zhang et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019). This casts an ur-
gent demand for developing robust classifiers with provable
worst-case guarantees.
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One promising approach for certifiable robustness is the
recent randomized smoothing method (Lecuyer et al., 2018;
Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2019;
Li et al., 2019; Dvijotham et al., 2020; Teng et al., 2020;
Jia et al., 2020), which constructs smoothed classifiers with
certifiable robustness by introducing noise on the inputs.
Compared with the other more traditional certification ap-
proaches (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Dvijotham et al., 2018;
Jordan et al., 2019) that exploits special structures of the
neural networks (such as the properties of ReLU), the ran-
domized smoothing methods work more flexibly on general
black-box classifiers and is shown to be more scalable and
provide tighter bounds on challenging datasets such as Ima-
geNet (Deng et al., 2009).
In addition, most existing randomized smoothing methods
use Gaussian noise for smoothing. Although appearing to
be a natural choice, one of our key observations is that the
Gaussian distribution is, in fact, a sub-optimal choice in
high dimensional spaces, even for `2 attack. Our obser-
vation shows there is a counter-intuitive phenomenon in
high dimensional spaces (Vershynin, 2018), that almost all
of the probability mass of standard Gaussian distribution
concentrates around the sphere surface of a certain radius.
This makes tuning the variance of Gaussian distribution
an inefficient way to trade off robustness and accuracy for
randomized smoothing.
Our Contributions We propose a general framework of ad-
versarial certification using non-Gaussian smoothing noises,
based on a new functional optimization perspective. Our
framework unifies the methods of Cohen et al. (2019) and
Teng et al. (2020) as special cases, and is applicable to more
general smoothing distributions and more types of attacks
beyond `2-norm setting. Leveraging our insight, we de-
velop a new family of distributions for better certification
results on `1, `2 and `∞ attacks. An efficient computational
approach is developed to enable our method in practice. Em-
pirical results show that our new framework and smoothing
distributions outperform existing approaches for `1, `2 and
`∞ attacking, on datasets such as CIFAR-10 and ImageNet.
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2. Related Works
Empirical Defenses Since Szegedy et al. (2013) and Good-
fellow et al. (2015), many previous works have focused on
utilizing small perturbation δ under certain constraint, e.g.
in a `p norm ball, to attack a neural network. Adversarial
training (Madry et al., 2018) and its variants (Kannan et al.,
2018; Zhang & Wang, 2019; Zhai et al., 2019) are the most
successful defense methods. However, these empirical de-
fense methods are still easy to be broken and cannot provide
provable defenses.
Certified Defenses Unlike the empirical defense methods,
once a classifier can guarantee a consistent prediction for
input within a local region, it is called a certified-robustness
classifier. Exact certification methods provide the minimal
perturbation condition which leads to a different classifica-
tion result. This line of work focus on deep neural networks
with ReLU-like activation that makes the classifier a piece-
wise linear function. This enables researchers to introduce
satisfiability modulo theories (Carlini et al., 2017; Ehlers,
2017) or mix integer linear programming (Cheng et al.,
2017; Dutta et al., 2018). Sufficient certification methods
take a conservative way and bound the Lipschitz constant
or other information of the network (Jordan et al., 2019;
Wong & Kolter, 2017; Raghunathan et al., 2018; Zhang
et al., 2018). However, these certification strategies share a
drawback that they are not feasible on large-scale scenarios,
e.g. large and deep networks and datasets.
Randomized Smoothing To mitigate this limitation of pre-
vious certifiable defenses, improving network robustness via
randomness has been recently discussed (Xie et al., 2018;
Liu et al., 2018). Lecuyer et al. (2018) first introduced ran-
domization with technique in differential privacy. Li et al.
(2019) improved their work with a bound given by Re´nyi di-
vergence. In succession, Cohen et al. (2019) firstly provided
a tight bound for arbitrary Gaussian smoothed classifiers
based on previous theorems found by Li & Kuelbs (1998).
Salman et al. (2019) combined the empirical and certifi-
cation robustness, by applying adversarial training on ran-
domized smoothed classifiers to achieve a higher certified
accuracy. Lee et al. (2019) focused on `0 norm perturba-
tion setting, and proposed a discrete smoothing distribution
which can be shown perform better than the widely used
Gaussian distribution. Teng et al. (2020) took a similar sta-
tistical testing approach with Cohen et al. (2019), utilizing
Laplacian smoothing to tackle `1 certification problem. Jia
et al. (2020) extended the approach of Cohen et al. (2019)
to a top-k setting. Dvijotham et al. (2020) extends the total
variant used by Cohen et al. (2019) to f -divergences. We
also focus on a generalization of randomized smoothing,
but with a different view on loosing the constrain about
classifier.
3. Black-box Certification with Functional
Optimization
We start from introducing background of the adversarial cer-
tification problem and the randomized smoothing method.
In Section 3.2, we propose our general framework for ad-
versarial certification using general smoothing noises, from
a new functional optimization perspective. Our framework
unifies the method of Cohen et al. (2019); Teng et al. (2020)
as special cases, and reveals a potential trade-off between
accuracy and robustness that provides important guidance
for better choices of smoothing distributions in Section 4.
3.1. Background
Adversarial Certification For simplicity, we consider bi-
nary classification of predicting binary labels y ∈ {0, 1}
given feature vectors x ∈ Rd. The extension to multi-class
cases is straightforward, and is discussed in Appendix D.
Furthermore, we assume f ] : Rd → [0, 1] is a given binary
classifier (] means the classifier is given), which maps from
the input space Rd to either the positive class probability in
interval [0, 1] or binary labels in {0, 1}. In the robustness
certification problem, a testing data point x0 ∈ Rd is given,
and one is asked to verify if the classifier outputs the same
prediction when the input x0 is perturbed arbitrarily in B, a
given neighborhood of x0. Specifically, let B be a set of pos-
sible perturbation vectors, e.g., B = {δ ∈ Rd : ‖δ‖p ≤ r}
for `p norm with a radius r. If the classifier predicts
y = 1 on x0, i.e. f ](x0) > 1/2, we want to verify if
f ](x0 + δ) > 1/2 still holds for any δ ∈ B. Through this
paper, we consider the most common adversarial settings:
`1, `2 and `∞ attacks.
Black-box Randomized Smoothing Certification Di-
rectly certifying f ] heavily relies on the smooth property
of f ], which has been explored in a series of prior works
(Wong & Kolter, 2017; Lecuyer et al., 2018). These meth-
ods typically depend on the special structure-property (e.g.,
the use of ReLU units) of f ], and thus can not serve as
general-purpose algorithms for any type of networks. In-
stead, We are interested in black-box verification methods
that could work for arbitrary classifiers. One approach to
enable this, as explored in recent works (Cohen et al., 2019;
Lee et al., 2019), is to replace f ] with a smoothed classi-
fier by convolving it with Gaussian noise, and verify the
smoothed classifier.
Specifically, assume pi0 is a smoothing distribution with
zero mean and bounded variance, e.g., pi0 = N (0, σ2). The
randomized smoothed classifier is defined by
f ]pi0(x0) := Ez∼pi0
[
f ](x0 + z)
]
,
which returns the averaged probability of x0 + z under the
perturbation of z ∼ pi0. Assume we replace the original
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classifier with f ]pi0 , then the goal becomes certifying f
]
pi0
using its inherent smoothness. Specifically, if f ]pi0(x0) >
1/2, we want to certify that f ]pi0(x0 + δ) > 1/2 for every
δ ∈ B, that is, we want to certify that
min
δ∈B
f ]pi0(x0 + δ) = minδ∈B
Ez∼pi0 [f ](x0 + z + δ)] >
1
2
.
(1)
In this case, it is sufficient to obtain a guaranteed lower
bound of minδ∈B f ]pi0(x0 + δ) and check if it is larger than
1/2. When pi0 is Gaussian N (0, σ2) and for `2 attack, this
problem was studied in Cohen et al. (2019), which shows
that a lower bound of
min
z∈B
Ez∼pi0 [f ](x0 + z)] ≥ Φ(Φ−1(f ]pi0(x0))−
r
σ
), (2)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function (CDF) of
standard Gaussian distribution, and Φ−1(·) represents its
inverse cumulative distribution function. The proof of this
result in Cohen et al. (2019) uses Neyman-Pearson lemma
(Li & Kuelbs, 1998). In the following section, we will show
that this bound is a special case of the proposed functional
optimization framework for robustness certification.
Note that the bound in Equation (2) is tractable since it only
requires to evaluate the smoothed classifier f ]pi0(x0) at the
original image x0, instead of solving the difficult adversarial
optimization over perturbation z in Equation (1). In practice,
f ]pi0(x0) is approximated by Monte Carlo approximation
with a non-asymptotic confidence bound.
3.2. Constrained Adversarial Certification
We propose a constrained adversarial certification
(CAC) framework, which yields a guaranteed lower bound
for Equation (1). The main idea is simple: assume F is a
function class which is known to include f ], then the fol-
lowing optimization immediately yields a guaranteed lower
bound
min
δ∈B
f ]pi0(x0 + δ) ≥
min
f∈F
min
δ∈B
{
fpi0(x0 + δ) s.t. fpi0(x0) = f
]
pi0(x0)
}
,
(3)
where we define fpi0(x0) = Ez∼pi0 [f(x0 + z)] for any
given f . Then we need to search for the minimum value of
fpi0(x0 + δ) for all classifiers in F that satisfies fpi0(x0) =
f ]pi0(x0). This obviously yields a lower bound once f
] ∈ F .
If F includes only f ], then the bound is exact, but is com-
putationally prohibitive due to the difficulty of optimizing
δ. The idea is then to choose F properly to incorporate rich
information of f ], while allowing us to calculate the lower
bound in Equation (3) computationally tractably. In this
paper, we consider the set of all functions bounded in [0, 1],
namely
F[0,1] =
{
f : f(z) ∈ [0, 1],∀z ∈ Rd
}
, (4)
which guarantees to include all f ] by definition. There are
other F that also yields computationally tractable bounds,
including the Lp functional space F = {f : ‖f‖Lp ≤ v},
which we leave for future work.
Denote by Lpi0(F ,B) the lower bound in Equation (3). We
can rewrite it into the following minimax form using the
Lagrangian function,
Lpi0(F ,B) = min
f∈F
min
δ∈B
max
λ∈R
L(f, δ, λ)
, min
f∈F
min
δ∈B
max
λ∈R
{
fpi0(x0 + δ)− λ(fpi0(x0)− f ]pi0(x0))
}
,
(5)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. Exchanging the min
and max yields the following dual form.
Theorem 1. I) (Dual Form) Denote by piδ the distribution
of z + δ when z ∼ pi0. Assume F and B are compact set.
We have the following lower bound of Lpi0(F ,B):
Lpi0(F ,B) ≥ max
λ≥0
min
f∈F
min
δ∈B
L(f, δ, λ)
= max
λ≥0
{
λf ]pi0(x0)−maxδ∈B DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
}
,
(6)
where we define the discrepancy term DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ) as
max
f∈F
{
λEz∼pi0 [f(x0 + z)]− Ez∼piδ [f(x0 + z)]
}
,
which measures the difference of λpi0 and piδ by seeking the
maximum discrepancy of the expectation for f ∈ F . As we
will show later, the bound in (6) is computationally tractable
with proper (F ,B, pi0).
II) When F = F[0,1] := {f : f(x) ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ Rd}, we
have in particular
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) =
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz,
where (t)+ = max(0, t). Furthermore, we have 0 ≤
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) ≤ λ for any pi0, piδ and λ > 0. Note
that DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) coincides with the total variation
distance between pi0 and piδ when λ = 1.
III) (Strong duality) Suppose F = F[0,1] and suppose
that for any λ ≥ 0, minδ∈Bminf∈F[0,1] L (f, δ, λ) =
minf∈F[0,1] L (f, δ
∗, λ), for some δ∗ ∈ B, we have
Vpi0 (F ,B) = max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F
L (f, δ, λ) .
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Remark We will show later that the proposed methods
and the cases we study satisfy the condition in part III of
the theorem and thus all the lower bounds of the proposed
method are tight.
Proof. First, observe that the constraint in Equation (3)
can be equivalently replaced by an inequality constraint
fpi0(x0) ≥ f ]pi0(x0). Therefore, the Lagrangian multiplier
can be restricted to be λ ≥ 0. We have
Lpi0(F ,B) = min
δ∈B
min
f∈F
max
λ≥0
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)]
+ λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)] )
≥max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)]
+ λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)] )
= max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
{
λf ]pi0(x0)
+ min
f∈F
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)]− λEpi0 [f(x0 + z)])
}
= max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
{
λf ]pi0(x0) − DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ)}
The proof of the strong duality is in Appendix A.1. II)
follows a straightforward calculation.
Although the lower bound in Equation (6) still involves
an optimization on δ and λ, both of them are much easier
than the original adversarial optimization in Equation (1).
With proper choices of F , B and pi0, the optimization of δ
can be shown to provide simple closed-form solutions by
exploiting the symmetry of B, and the optimization of λ is
a very simple one-dimensional searching problem.
As corollaries of Theorem 1, we can exactly recover the
bound derived by Teng et al. (2020) and Cohen et al. (2019)
under our functional optimization framework, different from
their original Neyman-Pearson lemma approach.
Corollary 1. With Laplacian noise pi0(·) = Laplace(·; b),
where Laplace(x; b) = 1
(2b)d
exp(−‖x‖1b ), `1 adversarial
setting B = {δ : ‖δ‖1 ≤ r} and F = F[0,1], the lower
bound in Equation (6) becomes
max
λ≥0
{
λf ]pi0(x0)− max‖δ‖1≤rDF[0,1] (λpi0‖piδ)
}
=
1− er/b(1− f ]pi0(x0)), when f ]pi0(x0) ≥ 1− 12e−r/b
1
2e
− rb−log[2(1−f]pi0 (x0)], when f ]pi0(x0) < 1− 12e−r/b
(7)
Thus, with our previous explanation,
Lpi0(F ,B) ≥
1
2
⇐⇒ r ≤ −b log [2(1− f ]pi0(x0))] .
which is exactly the `1 certification radius derived by Teng
et al. (2020). See Appendix A.2 for proof details.
For Gaussian noise setting which has been frequently
adopted, we have
Corollary 2. With isotropic Gaussian noise pi0 =
N (0, σ2Id×d), `2 attack B = {δ : ‖δ‖2 ≤ r} and
F = F[0,1], the lower bound in Equation (6) becomes
max
λ≥0
{
λf ]pi0(x0)− max‖δ‖2≤rDF[0,1] (λpi0‖piδ)
}
=Φ
(
Φ−1(f ]pi0(x0))−
r
σ
)
.
(8)
Analogously, we can retrieve the main theoretical result of
Cohen et al. (2019):
Lpi0(F ,B) ≥
1
2
⇐⇒ r ≤ σΦ−1(f ]pi0(x0)).
See Appendix A.3 for proof details.
3.3. Trade-off between Accuracy and Robustness
The lower bound in Equation (6) reflects an intuitive trade-
off between the robustness and accuracy on the certification
problem:
max
λ≥0
[
λf ]pi0(x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accuracy
−max
δ∈B
DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Robustness
]
, (9)
where the first term reflects the accuracy of the smoothed
classifier (assuming the true label is y = 1), while the sec-
ond term maxδ∈B DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ) measures the robustness
of the smoothing method, via the maximum difference be-
tween the original smoothing distribution pi0 and perturbed
distribution piδ for δ ∈ B. The maximization of dual co-
efficient λ can be viewed as searching for a best balance
between these two terms to achieve the largest lower bound.
More critically, different choices of smoothing distribu-
tions also yield a trade-off between accuracy and robust-
ness in Equation (9). A good choice of the smooth-
ing distribution should well balance the accuracy and ro-
bustness, by distributing its mass properly to yield small
maxδ∈B DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ) and large f ]pi0(x0) simultaneously.
4. Improving Certification Bounds with a
New Distribution Family
In this section, we identify a key problem of the usage of
Laplacian and Gaussian noise in high dimensional space,
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due to the “thin shell” phenomenon that the probability mass
of them concentrates on a sphere far away from the center
points (Vershynin, 2018). Motivated by this pivotal observa-
tion, we propose a new family of smoothing distributions
that alleviate this problem for `1, `2 and `∞ attack.
4.1. A New Distribution Family
Although the isotropic Gaussian distribution appears to be a
natural choice of the smoothing distribution, they are sub-
optimal for a trade-off between accuracy and robustness
in Equation (9), especially in high dimensions. The key
problem is that, in high dimensional spaces, the probability
mass of Gaussian distributions concentrates on a thin shell
away from the center. Specifically,
Lemma 1 (Vershynin (2018), Section 3.1). Let
z ∼ N (0, Id×d) be a d-dimensional standard
Gaussian random variable. Then there exists a
constant c, such that for any δ ∈ (0, 1), Prob(√
d−√c log(2/δ) ≤ ‖z‖2 ≤ √d+√c log(2/δ)) ≥
1− δ. See Vershynin (2018) for more discussion.
This suggests that with high probability, z takes values very
close to the sphere of radius
√
d, within a constant distance
from that sphere. There exists similar phenomenon for
Laplacian distribution:
Lemma 2 (Chebyshev bound). Let z be a d-dimensional
Laplacian random variable, z = (z1, · · · , zd), where zi ∼
Laplace(1), i = 1, · · · , d. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
Prob
(
1− 1/√dδ ≤ ‖z‖1 /d ≤ 1 + 1/
√
dδ
)
≥ 1− δ.
This phenomenon makes it sub-optimal to use standard
Gaussian or Laplacian distribution for adversarial certifica-
tion, because one would expect that the smoothing distri-
bution should concentrate around the center (the original
image) in order to make the smoothed classifier close to
the original classifier (and hence accurate). To illustrate the
problem, consider a simple example when the true classifier
is f ](x) = I(‖x− x0‖2 ≤ 
√
d) for a constant  < 1,
where I is the indicator function. Then when the dimension
d is large, we would have f ](x0) = 1 while f ]pi0(x0) ≈ 0
when pi0 = N (0, Id×d). It is of course possible to decrease
the variance of pi0 to improve the accuracy of the smoothed
classifier f ]pi0 . However, this would significantly improve
the distance term in Equation (9) and does not yield an
optimal trade-off on accuracy and robustness.
In this work, we introduce a new distribution family to ad-
dress this curse of dimensionality. To motivate our method,
it is useful to examine the density function of the distribu-
tions of the radius of spherical distributions in general.
Lemma 3. Assume z is a symmetric random variable onRd
with a probability density function (PDF) of form pi0(z) ∝
φ(‖z‖), where φ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is a univariate function,
then the PDF of the norm of z is p‖z‖(r) ∝ rd−1φ(r). The
term rd−1 arises due to the integration on the surface of
radius r norm ball in Rd. Here ‖·‖ can be any Lp norm.
In particular, when z ∼ N (0, σ2Id×d), we have
φ(r) = exp(−r2/(2σ2)) and hence p‖z‖2(r) ∝
rd−1 exp(−r2/(2σ2)), which is a scaled Chi distribution,
also known as Nakagami distribution. Examining this PDF,
we can see that the concentration of the norm is caused by
the rd−1 term, which makes the density to be highly peaked
when d is large. To alleviate the concentration phenomenon,
we need to have a way to cancel out the effect of rd−1. This
motivates the following family of smoothing distributions:
pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−kn1 exp
(
−‖z‖
p
n2
b
)
,
where parameters n1, n2, p ∈ N. How to choose suitable n1
and n2 is depend on the perturbation region.
4.2. `1 and `2 Region Certification
We propose typical distribution belongs to the proposed
distribution family for `1 and `2 region certification.
For the `2 case, we propose:
pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k2 exp
(
−‖z‖
2
2
2σ2
)
,
and hence p‖z‖2(r) ∝ rd−k−1 exp
(
− r
2
2σ2
)
,
(10)
where we introduce the ‖z‖−k2 term in pi0, with k a positive
parameter, to make the radius distribution less concentrated
when k is large. As for `1 certification, we also introduce a
‖z‖−k1 term to force a more centralized distribution:
pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k1 exp
(
−‖z‖1
b
)
,
and hence p‖z‖1(r) ∝ rd−k−1 exp
(
−r
b
)
.
(11)
The radius distribution in Equation (10) and Equation (11)
is controlled by two parameters: σ (or b) and k, where σ
(or b) controls the scale of the distribution (and is hence
the scale parameter), while k controls the shape of the
distribution (and hence the shape parameter). The key
idea is that adjusting k allows us to control the trade-off
the accuracy and robustness more precisely. As shown in
Figure 1, adjusting σ enables us to move the mean close
to zero (hence yielding higher accuracy), but at cost of
decreasing the variance quadratically (hence less robust). In
contrast, adjusting k allows us to decrease the mean without
significantly impacting the variance, and hence yield a much
better trade-off on accuracy and robustness.
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Figure 1. Starting from radius distribution in Equation (10) with
d = 100, σ = 1 and k = 0 (black star), increasing k (green curve)
allows us to move the mean towards zero without significantly
reducing the variance. Decreasing σ (red curve) can also decrease
the mean, but with a cost of decreasing the variance quadratically.
Computational Method With the more general cen-
tripetal smoothing distribution, we no longer have the
closed-form solution of the bound like Equation (8) and
Equation (7). However, efficient computational methods can
still be developed for calculating the bound in Equation (6)
with pi0 in Equation (10). The key is that the maximum of
the distance term DF[0,1](λpi0 || piδ) over δ ∈ B is always
achieved on the boundary of B as we show in the sequel,
while the optimization on λ ≥ 0 is one-dimensional and can
be solved numerically efficiently.
Theorem 2. Consider the `1 attack with B =
{δ : ‖δ‖1 ≤ r} and smoothing distribution pi0(z) ∝
‖z‖−k1 exp
(
−‖z‖1b
)
with k ≥ 0 and b > 0, or the `2
attack with B = {δ : ‖δ‖2 ≤ r} and smoothing distribu-
tion pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k2 exp
(
−‖z‖222σ2
)
with k ≥ 0 and σ > 0.
Define δ∗ = [r, 0, ..., 0]>, we have
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) = max
δ∈B
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
for any positive λ.
The complete proof is in Appendix. With Theorem 2, we
can compute Equation (6) with δ = δ∗. We then calcu-
late DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) using Monte Carlo approximation.
Note that
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) = Ez∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ∗(z)
pi0(z)
)
+
]
,
which can be approximated with Monte Carlo method with
Hoeffding concentration bound. Let {zi}ni=1 be i.i.d. sam-
ples from pi0, then we approximateDF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) with
Dˆ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(λ− piδ∗(zi)/pi0(zi))+ .
As a result of 0 ≤ (λ− piδ∗(zi)/pi0(zi))+ ≤ λ,
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) will range in the following confidence
interval
[Dˆ − λ
√
log(2/δ)/(2n), Dˆ + λ
√
log(2/δ)/(2n)]
with confidence level 1 − δ for δ ∈ (0, 1). Drawing a
sufficiently large number of samples allows us to achieve
approximation with arbitrary accuracy.
4.3. `∞ Region Certification
Going beyond the `1 and `2 attack, we consider the `∞
attack, whose attacking region is B`∞,r = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ r}.
The commonly used Gaussian smoothing distribution, as
well as our `2-based smoothing distribution in Equation (10),
is unsuitable for this region.
Corollary 3. With the smoothing distribution pi0 in Equa-
tion (10) for k ≥ 0, σ > 0, and F = F[0,1] shown in
Equation (4), the bound we get for certifying the `∞ attack
on B`∞,r = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ r} is equivalent to that for cer-
tifying the `2 attack on B`2,√dr = {δ : ‖δ‖2 ≤
√
dr}, that
is,
Lpi0(F[0,1], B`∞,r) = Lpi0(F[0,1], B`2,√dr).
As shown in this corollary, if we use Equation (10) as the
smoothing distribution for `∞ attack, the bound we ob-
tain is effectively the bound we would get for verifying a
`2 ball with radius
√
dr, which is too large to give mean-
ingful results when the dimension is high. The maximum
distance maxδ∈B`∞,r DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ) is achieved at one of
these pointy points, i.e., δ∗ = [
√
dr, 0, ..., 0]>, making it
equivalent to optimizing in the `2 ball with radius
√
dr.
In order to address this problem, we extend our proposed
distribution family with new distributions which are more
suitable for `∞ certification setting. We propose the follow-
ing two new smoothing distributions for `∞ certification:
pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k∞ exp
(
−‖z‖
2
∞
2σ2
)
, (12)
pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k∞ exp
(
−‖z‖
2
2
2σ2
)
. (13)
The motivation is to allocate more probability mass
along the “pointy” directions with larger `∞ norm,
and hence decrease the maximum distance term
maxδ∈B`∞,r DF (λpi0 ‖ piδ), see Figure 2 for illumi-
nation.
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Figure 2. For `∞ attacking, compared with the distribution in
Equation (10), the mixed norm distribution in Equation (13) (right)
yields smaller discrepancy term (because of larger overlap areas),
and hence higher robustness and better confidence bound. The
distribution described in Equation (12) has the same impact.
Computational Method In order to compute the lower
bound when using Equation (12) and Equation (13), we
need to establish the closed form solution of the maximum
distance term maxδ∈B DF[0,1](λpi0 || piδ), which is similar
to Theorem 2. The following result shows that the optimal δ
is achieved at one vertex (the pointy points) of the `∞ ball.
Theorem 3. Consider the `∞ attack with B`∞,r =
{δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ r} and the mixed norm smoothing distribu-
tion in Equation (13) with k ≥ 0 and σ > 0. Define
δ∗ = [r, r, ..., r]>. We have for any λ > 0,
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) = max
δ∈B
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) .
The proofs of Theorem 2 and 3 are non-trivial, thus we
defer the details to the Appendix. With the optimal δ∗
found above, we can calculate the bound with similar Monte
Carlo approximation outlined in Section 4.2.
5. Experiments
We evaluate our new certification bound and smoothing
distributions for `1, `2 and `∞ attacks. We compare with
the randomized smoothing method of Teng et al. (2020)
with Laplacian smoothing for `1 region cerification. For
`2 and `∞ cases, we regard the method derived by Cohen
et al. (2019) with Gaussian smoothing distribution as the
baseline. For fair comparisons, we use the same model
architecture and pre-trained models provided by Teng et al.
(2020), Cohen et al. (2019) and Salman et al. (2019), which
are ResNet-110 for CIFAR-10 and ResNet-50 for ImageNet.
We defer more details, hyperparameters, and the settings to
the Appendix B.1.
Evaluation Metrics The methods are evaluated using the
certified accuracy defined in Cohen et al. (2019). Given an
input image x and a perturbation region B, the smoothed
classifier certifies image x correctly if the prediction is
correct and has a guaranteed confidence lower bound larger
than 1/2 for any δ ∈ B. The certified accuracy is the
percentage of images that are certified correctly. Following
Salman et al. (2019), we calculate the certified accuracy
of all the classifiers in Cohen et al. (2019) or Salman et al.
(2019) for various radius, and report the best results over all
of classifiers. We use the official code 1 provided by Cohen
et al. (2019) for all the following experiments.
5.1. `1 Certification
We compare our method with Teng et al. (2020) on CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet for `1 certification with the type 1 trained
model in Teng et al. (2020). As shown in Table 1, our non-
Laplacian centripetal distribution consistently outperforms
the result of Teng et al. (2020) for any radius, e.g., for the
radius 1.0, our proposed distribution in Equation (11) is
able to improve the original baseline accuracy from 23% to
27%.
`1 RADIUS 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25
BASELINE (%) 62 49 38 30 23 19 17 14 12
OURS (%) 64 51 41 34 27 22 18 17 14
Table 1. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers with vari-
ous `1 radius on CIFAR-10.
We summarize the result on ImageNet in Table 2, which
shows that our method outperforms the baseline’s result
uniformly for all `1 radius.
`1 RADIUS 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
BASELINE (%) 50 41 33 29 25 18 15
OURS (%) 51 42 36 30 26 22 16
Table 2. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers with vari-
ous `1 radius on ImageNet.
5.2. `2 Certification
We compare our method with Cohen et al. (2019) on CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet for `2 certification. For a fair comparison,
we use the same pre-trained models as Cohen et al. (2019),
which is trained with Gaussian noise on both CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet dataset. Table 3 and Table 4 report the certified
accuracy of our method and the baseline on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet respectively. We find that our method consistently
outperforms the baseline. Since we fix the same k across
all the models and all the radius, the improvement cannot
be obtained by tuning σ2 fine-grainedly. The readers are
referred to the Appendix C for detailed ablation studies.
1https://github.com/locuslab/smoothing
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`2 RADIUS 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25
BASELINE (%) 60 43 34 23 17 14 12 10 8
OURS (%) 61 46 37 25 19 16 14 11 9
Table 3. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers with vari-
ous `2 radius on CIFAR-10.
`2 RADIUS 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
BASELINE (%) 49 37 29 19 15 12 9
OURS (%) 50 39 31 21 17 13 10
Table 4. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers with vari-
ous `2 radius on ImageNet.
5.3. `∞ Certification
Toy Example We first construct a simple toy example to
verify the advantages of the distribution Equation (13) and
Equation (12) over the `2 family in Equation (10).
We assume that the true classifier is f ](x) = I(‖x‖2 ≤ r)
in r = 0.65, d = 5 case and plot in Figure 3 the Pareto fron-
tier of the accuracy and robustness terms in Equation (9) for
the three families of smoothing distributions, as we search
for the best combinations of parameters (k, σ). We can see
that the mixed norm smoothing distribution clearly obtain
the best trade-off on accuracy and robustness, and hence
guarantees a tighter lower bound for certification. Figure 3
also shows that the distribution in Equation (12) even per-
forms worse than the distribution described in Equation (10).
We further prove that Equation (12) is provably not suitable
for `∞ region certification in Appendix A.5.
l∞ RADIUS 2/255 4/255 6/255 8/255 10/255 12/255
BASELINE (%) 58 42 31 25 18 13
OURS (%) 60 47 38 32 23 17
Table 5. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers with vari-
ous l∞ radius on CIFAR-10.
CIFAR-10 Based on the conclusion of the toy case, we
only compared the method defined by Equation (13) with
Salman et al. (2019) on CIFAR-10 using the models trained
by Salman et al. (2019). The certified accuracy of our
method and the baseline using Gaussian smoothing dis-
tribution and Corollary 3 are shown in Table 5. We can
see that our method consistently outperforms the Gaussian
distribution baseline by a large margin, which empirically
shows our distribution is a more suitable distribution for `∞
perturbation.
To further confirm the advantage of our method, we plot in
Figure 4 the certified accuracy of our method and Gaussian
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Figure 3. The Pareto frontier of accuracy and robustness (in the
sense of Equation (9)) of the three smoothing families in Equa-
tion (10), Equation (13), and Equation (12) for `∞ attacking, when
we search for the best parameters (k, σ) for each of them. The
mixed norm family Equation (13) yields the best trade-off than
the other two. We assume f ](x) = I(‖x‖2 ≤ r) and dimension
d = 5. The case when f ](x) = I(‖x‖∞ ≤ r) has similar result
(not shown).
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Figure 4. Results of `∞ verification on CIFAR-10, on models
trained with Gaussian noise data augmentation with different vari-
ances σ0. Our method obtains consistently better results.
baseline using models trained with Gaussian perturbation of
different variances σ0, under different `∞ radius. We again
find that our approach outperforms the baseline consistently,
especially when the `∞ radius is large. We also experi-
mented our method and baseline on ImageNet, but did not
obtain non-trivial results. This is because `∞ verification
is extremely hard with very large dimensions. Future work
will investigate how to obtain non-trivial bounds for `∞
attacking at ImageNet scales with smoothing classifiers.
6. Conclusion
We propose a general functional optimization based frame-
work of adversarial certification with non-Gaussian smooth-
ing distributions. Based on the insights from our new frame-
work and high dimensional geometry, we propose a new
family of non-Gaussian smoothing distributions, which out-
perform the Gaussian and Laplace smoothing for certifying
`1, `2 and `∞ attacking. Our work provides a basis for a
variety of future directions, including improved methods for
`p attacks, and tighter bounds based on adding additional
constraints to our optimization framework.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof for the strong duality in Theorem 1
We first introduce the following lemma, which is a straight forward generalization of the strong Lagrange duality to
functional optimization case.
Lemma 4. Given some δ∗, we have
max
λ∈R
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
= max
λ∈R
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
.
The proof of Lemma 4 is standard. However, for completeness, we include it here.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume f ]pi0(x0) ∈ (0, 1), otherwise the feasible set is trivial.
Let α∗ be the value of the optimal solution of the primal problem. We define f ]pi0(x0) − Epi0 [f(x0 + z)] = h[f ] and
g[f ] = Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)]. We define the following two sets:
A = {(v, t) ∈ R× R : ∃f ∈ F[0,1], h[f ] = v, g[f ] ≤ t}
B = {(0, s) ∈ R× R : s < α∗} .
Notice that both sets A and B are convex. This is obvious for B. For any (v1, t1) ∈ A and (v2, t2) ∈ A, we define
f1 ∈ F[0,1] such that h[f1] = v1, g[f1] ≤ t1 (and similarly we define f2). Notice that for any γ ∈ [0, 1], we have
γf1 + (1− γ)f2 ∈ F[0,1]
γh[f1] + (1− γ)h[f2] = γv1 + (1-γ)v2
γg[f1] + (1− γ)g[f2] ≤ γt1 + (1− γ)t2,
which implies that γ(v1, t1) + (1 − γ)(v2, t2) ∈ A and thus A is convex. Also notice that by definition, A ∩ B = ∅.
Using separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a point (q1, q2) 6= (0, 0) and a value α such that for any (v, t) ∈ A,
q1v + q2t ≥ α and for any (0, s) ∈ B, q2s ≤ α. Notice that we must have q2 ≥ 0, otherwise, for sufficient s, we will have
q2s > α. We thus have, for any f ∈ F[0,1], we have
q1h[f ] + q2g[f ] ≥ α∗ ≥ q2α∗.
If q2 > 0, we have
max
λ∈R
min
f∈F[0,1]
g[f ] + λh[f ] ≥ min
f∈F[0,1]
g[f ] +
q1
q2
h[f ] ≥ α∗,
which gives the strong duality. If q2 = 0, we have for any f ∈ F[0,1], q1h[f ] ≥ 0 and by the separating hyperplane theorem,
q1 6= 0. However, this case is impossible: If q1 > 0, choosing f ≡ 1 gives q1h[f ] = q1
(
f ]pi0(x0)− 1
)
< 0; If q1 < 0, by
choosing f ≡ 0, we have q1h[f ] = q1
(
f ]pi0(x0)− 0
)
< 0. Both cases give contradiction.
Based on Lemma 4, we have the proof of the strong duality as follows.
Notice that by Lagrange multiplier method, our primal problem can be rewritten as follows:
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
max
λ∈R
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
,
and the dual problem is
max
λ∈R
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
= max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
.
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By the assumption that for any λ ≥ 0, we have
max
λ≥0
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
= max
λ≥0
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
,
for some δ∗ ∈ B. We have
max
λ∈R
min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
= max
λ≥0
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
= max
λ∈R
min
f∈F[0,1]
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
∗
= min
f∈F[0,1]
max
λ∈R
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
≥min
δ∈B
min
f∈F[0,1]
max
λ∈R
Epiδ∗ [f(x0 + z)] + λ
(
f ]pi0(x0)− Epi0 [f(x0 + z)]
)
,
where the second equality (*) is by Lemma 4.
A.2. Proof for Corollary 1
Proof. Given our confidence lower bound
max
λ≥0
min
‖δ‖1≤r
{
λp0 −
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz
}
,
One can show that the worst case for δ is obtained when δ∗ = (r, 0, · · · , 0) (see following subsection), thus the bound is
max
λ≥0
{
λp0 −
∫
1
2b
exp
(
−|z1|
b
)[
λ− exp
( | z1 | −|z1 + r|
b
)]
+
dz1
}
.
Denote a to be the solution of λ = exp
(
|a|−|a+r|
b
)
, then obviously we have
a =

−∞, b log λ ≥ r
− 12 (b log λ+ r) , −r < b log λ < r
+∞. b log λ ≤ −r
So the bound above is
λ
∫
z1>a
1
2b
exp
(
−|z1|
b
)
dz1 −
∫
z1>a
1
2b
exp
(
−|z1 + r|
b
)
dz1.
i) b log λ ≥ r ⇔ λ ≥ exp ( rb )
the bound is
max
λ≥er/b
{λp0 − (λ− 1)} = 1− exp
(r
b
)
(1− p0) .
ii) −r < b log λ < r ⇔ exp (− rb ) < λ < exp ( rb )
the bound is
max
λ
{
λp0 − λ
[
1− 1
2
exp
(
−b log λ+ r
2b
)]
+
1
2
exp
(
b log λ− r
2b
)}
= max
λ
{
λ(p0 − 1) + λ
2
exp
(
−b log λ+ r
2b
)
+
1
2
exp
(
b log λ− r
2b
)}
=
1
2
exp
(
− log [2(1− p0)]− r
b
)
.
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the extremum is achieved when λˆ = exp
(−2 log [2(1− p0)]− rb ). Notice that λˆ does not necessarily locate in(
e−r/b, er/b
)
, so the actual bound is always equal or less than 12 exp
(− log [2(1− p0)]− rb ).
iii) b log λ ≤ −r ⇔ λ ≤ exp (− rb )
the bound is
max
λ≤exp(− rb )
λ · p0 = p0 exp
(
−r
b
)
.
Since λˆ > er/b ⇔ p0 > 1− 12 exp(− rb ), notice that the lower bound is a concave function w.r.t. λ, making the final lower
bound become {
1− exp ( rb ) (1− p0) , when p0 > 1− 12 exp(− rb )
1
2 exp
(− log [2(1− p0)]− rb ) . otherwise
Remark Actually, we have 1− exp ( rb ) (1− p0) ≤ 12 exp (− log [2(1− p0)]− rb ) all the time. Another interesting thing
is that both the bound can lead to the same radius bound:
1− exp
(r
b
)
(1− p0) > 1
2
⇔ r < −b log [2(1− p0)]
1
2
exp
(
− log [2(1− p0)]− r
b
)
>
1
2
⇔ r < −b log [2(1− p0)]
A.3. Proof for Corollary 2
Proof. With strong duality, our confidence lower bound is
min
‖δ‖2≤r
max
λ≥0
{
λp0 −
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz
}
,
define Cλ = {z : λpi0(z) ≥ piδ(z)} = {z : δ>z ≤ ‖δ‖
2
2 + σ
2 lnλ} and Φ(·) to be the cdf of standard gaussian distribution,
then ∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz
=
∫
Cλ
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z)) dz
=λ · P (N(z;0, σ2I) ∈ Cλ)− P (N(z; δ, σ2I) ∈ Cλ)
=λ · Φ
(‖δ‖2
2σ
+
σ lnλ
‖δ‖2
)
− Φ
(−‖δ‖2
2σ
+
σ lnλ
‖δ‖2
)
.
Define
F (δ, λ) := λp0 −
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz = λp0 − λ · Φ
(‖δ‖2
2σ
+
σ lnλ
‖δ‖2
)
+ Φ
(−‖δ‖2
2σ
+
σ lnλ
‖δ‖2
)
.
For ∀δ, F is a concave function w.r.t. λ, as F is actually a summation of many concave piece wise linear function. See
Boyd & Vandenberghe (2004) for more discussions of properties of concave functions.
Define λˆδ = exp
(
2σ‖δ‖2Φ−1(p0)−‖δ‖22
2σ2
)
, simple calculation can show ∂F (δ,λ)∂λ |λ=λˆδ = 0, which means
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min
‖δ‖2≤r
max
λ≥0
F (δ, λ) = min
‖δ‖2≤r
F (δ, λδ)
= min
‖δ‖2≤r
{
0 + Φ
(
−‖δ‖2
2σ
+
σ ln λˆδ
‖δ‖2
)}
= min
‖δ‖2≤r
Φ
(
Φ−1(p0)− ‖δ‖2
σ
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(p0)− r
σ
)
This tells us
min
‖δ‖2≤r
max
λ≥0
F (δ, λ) > 1/2⇔ Φ
(
Φ−1(p0)− r
σ
)
> 1/2⇔ r < σ · Φ−1(p0),
i.e. the certification radius is σ ·Φ−1(p0). This is exactly the core theoretical contribution of Cohen et al. (2019). This bound
has a straight forward expansion for multi-class classification situations, we refer interesting readers to Appendix D.
A.4. Proof For Theorem 2 and 3
A.4.1. PROOF FOR `2 AND `∞ CASES
Here we consider a more general smooth distribution pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k1∞ ‖z‖−k22 exp
(
−‖z‖222σ2
)
, for some k1, k2 ≥ 0 and
σ > 0. We first gives the following key theorem shows that DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) increases as |δi| becomes larger for every
dimension i.
Theorem 4. Suppose pi0(z) ∝ ‖z‖−k1∞ ‖z‖−k22 exp
(
−‖z‖222σ2
)
, for some k1, k2 ≥ 0 and σ > 0, for any λ ≥ 0 we have
sgn(δi)
∂
∂δi
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) ≥ 0,
for any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}.
Theorem 2 and 3 directly follows the above theorem. Notice that in Theorem 2, as our distribution is spherical symmetry, it
is equivalent to set B = {δ : δ = [a, 0, ..., 0]>, a ≤ r} by rotating the axis.
Proof. Given λ, k1 and k2, we define φ1(s) = s−k1 , φ2(s) = s−k2e−
s2
σ2 . Notice that φ1 and φ2 are monotone decreasing
for non-negative s. By the symmetry, without loss of generality, we assume δ = [δ1, ..., δd]> for δi ≥ 0, i ∈ [d]. Notice that
∂
∂δi
‖x0 − δ‖∞= I{‖x0 − δ‖∞ = |xi − δi|}
∂
∂δi
√
(xi − δi)2
= I{‖x0 − δ‖∞ = |xi − δi|}
− (xi − δi)
‖x0 − δ‖∞
.
And also
∂
∂δi
‖x0 − µ‖2 =
∂
∂δi
√∑
i
(xi − µi)2
=
− (xi − µi)
‖x0 − µ‖2
.
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We thus have
∂
∂δ1
∫
(λpi0(x0)− piδ(x0))+ dx0
=−
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0)} ∂
∂δ1
piδ(x0)dx0
=
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0)}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
=
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
+
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0,
where we define
F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2)
= φ′1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞)φ2 (‖x0 − δ‖2) I{‖x0 − δ‖∞ = |x1 − δ1|}
(x1 − δ1)
‖x0 − δ‖∞
+ φ1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞)φ′2 (‖x0 − δ‖2)
(x1 − δ1)
‖x0 − δ‖2
.
Notice that as φ′1 ≤ 0 and φ′2 ≤ 0 and we have∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0 ≤ 0∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0 ≥ 0.
Our target is to prove that ∂∂δ1
∫
(λpi0(x0)− piδ(x0))+ dx0 ≥ 0. Now define the set
H1 = {x0 : λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > δ1}
H2 =
{
[2δ1 − x1, x2, ..., xd]> : x0 = [x1, ..., xd]> ∈ H1
}
.
Here the set H2 is defined as a image of a bijection
proj(x0) = [2δ1 − x1, x2, ..., xd]> = x˜0,
that is constrained on the set H1. Notice that under our definition,∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
=
∫
H1
F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0.
Now we prove that ∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < δ1}F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
(1)
≥
∫
H2
F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
(2)
=
∣∣∣∣∫
H1
F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0
∣∣∣∣ .
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Property of the projection Before we prove the (1) and (2), we give the following property of the defined projection
function. For any x˜0 = proj(x0), x0 ∈ H1, we have
‖x0 − δ‖∞ = ‖x˜0 − δ‖∞
‖x0 − δ‖2 = ‖x˜0 − δ‖2
‖x0‖2 ≥ ‖x˜0‖2
‖x0‖∞ ≥ ‖x˜0‖∞ .
This is because
x˜i = xi, i ∈ [d]− {1}
x˜1 = 2δ1 − x1,
and by the fact that x1 ≥ δ1 ≥ 0, we have |x˜1| ≤ |x1| and |x˜1 − δ1| ≤ |x1 − δ1|.
Proof of Equality (2) By the fact that proj is bijective constrained on the set H1 and the property of proj, we have∫
H2
F1 (‖x˜0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x˜0 − δ‖2) dx˜0
=
∫
H2
φ′1 (‖x˜0 − δ‖∞)φ2 (‖x˜0 − δ‖2) I{‖x˜0 − δ‖∞ = |x˜1 − δ1|}
(x˜1 − δ1)
‖x˜0 − δ‖∞
dx˜0
+
∫
H2
φ1 (‖x˜0 − δ‖∞)φ′2 (‖x˜0 − δ‖2)
(x˜1 − δ1)
‖x˜0 − δ‖2
dx˜0
(∗)
=
∫
H1
φ′1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞)φ2 (‖x0 − δ‖2) I{‖x0 − δ‖∞ = |x1 − δ1|}
(δ1 − x1)
‖x0 − δ‖∞
|det (J)| dx0
+
∫
H1
φ1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞)φ′2 (‖x0 − δ‖2)
(δ1 − x1)
‖x0 − δ‖2
dx0
=−
∫
H1
F1 (‖x0 − δ‖∞ , ‖x0 − δ‖2) dx0,
where (∗) is by change of variable x˜0 = proj(x0) and J is the Jacobian matrix J =

−1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
 and here we
have the fact that x˜1 − δ1 = (2δ1 − x1)− δ1 = −(x1 − δ1).
Proof of Inequality (1) This can be done by verifying that H2 ⊆ {x0 : λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < δ1}. By the property
of the projection, for any x0 ∈ H1, let x˜0 = proj(x0), then λpi0(x˜0) ≥ λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0) = piδ(x˜0) (by the fact
that t φ1 and φ2 are monotone decreasing). It implies that for any x˜0 ∈ H2, we have λpi0(x˜0) ≥ piδ(x˜0) and thus
H2 ⊆ {x0 : pi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < δ1}.
Final statement By the above result, we have
∂
∂δ1
∫
(λpi0(x0)− piδ(x0))+ dx0 ≥ 0,
and the same result holds for any ∂∂δ1
∫
(λpi0(x0)− piδ(x0))+ dx0, i ∈ [d], which implies our result.
A.4.2. PROOF FOR `1 CASE
Slightly different for former cases, apart from proving ∂∂δiDF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) ≥ 0 for ∀δi ≥ 0, we also need to demonstrate
Theorem 5. Suppose pi0(x0) ∝ ‖x0‖−k exp
(
−‖x0‖1b
)
, then for δ = (r, d − r, δ3, δ4, · · · ) and δ˜ = (0, d, δ3, δ4, · · · ),
0 < r < d, we have
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) ≥ DF[0,1]
(
λpi0 ‖ piδ˜
)
Black-Box Certification with Randomized Smoothing: A Functional Optimization Based Framework
Proof. We turn to show that
∂
∂r
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) ≤ 0,
for δ = (r, d− r, δ3, δ4, · · · ) and r < d/2. We define φ(s) = s−k exp(− sb ). With
∂
∂δi
‖x0 − δ‖1 =
∂
∂δi
|xi − δi| = −sgn(xi − δi) = δi − xi|xi − δi| ,
We have
∂
∂r
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
=−
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0)} ∂
∂r
piδ(x0)dx0
=
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0)}F (x0)dx0,
where
F (x0) =− ∂
∂r
φ (‖x0 − δ‖1) = −φ′ (‖x0 − δ‖1)
∂
∂r
‖x0 − δ‖1
= φ′ (‖x0 − δ‖1)
∂
∂r
(|x1 − r|+ |x2 − d+ r|)
= φ′ (‖x0 − δ‖1) · (sgn(x1 − r) + sgn(d− x2 − r)) .
Thus the original derivative becomes
=
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > r, x2 < d− r}F (x0)dx0
+
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > r, x2 > d− r}F (x0)dx0
+
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < r, x2 > d− r}F (x0)dx0
+
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < r, x2 < d− r}F (x0)dx0
=2
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > r, x2 < d− r}φ′(‖x0 − δ‖1)dx0
− 2
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < r, x2 > d− r}φ′(‖x0 − δ‖1)dx0
We only need to show that∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 > r, x2 < d− r}φ′(‖x0 − δ‖1)dx0 ≥
∫
I {λpi0(x0) ≥ piδ(x0), x1 < r, x2 > d− r}φ′(‖x0 − δ‖1)dx0.
Notice that r < d/2, therefore this can be proved with a similar projection x0 7→ x˜0:
(x1, x2, x3, x4, · · · ) 7→ (2r − x1, 2d− 2r − x2, x3, x4, · · · )
and the similar deduction as previous theorem.
A.5. Theoretical Demonstration about the Ineffetivity of Equation (12)
Theorem 6. Consider the adversarial attacks on the `∞ ball B`∞,r = {δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ r}. Suppose we use the smoothing
distribution pi0 in Equation (12) and choose the parameters (k, σ) such that
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1) ‖z‖∞ is stochastic bounded when z ∼ pi0, in that for any  > 0, there exists a finite M > 0 such that Ppi0(|z| > M) ≤ ;
2) the mode of ‖z‖∞ under pi0 equals Cr, where C is some fixed positive constant,
then for any  ∈ (0, 1) and sufficiently large dimension d, there exists a constant t > 1, such that , we have
max
δ∈B`∞,r
{
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
}
≥ (1− ) (λ−O(t−d)) .
This shows that, in very high dimensions, the maximum distance term is arbitrarily close to λ which is the maximum
possible value of DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) (see Theorem 1). In particular, this implies that in high dimensional scenario, once
f ]pi0(x0) ≤ (1− ) for some small , we have Lpi0(F[0,1], B`∞,r) = O(t−d) and thus fail to certify.
Remark The condition 1) and 2) in Theorem 6 are used to ensure that the magnitude of the random perturbations generated
by pi0 is within a reasonable range such that the value of f ]pi0(x0) is not too small, in order to have a high accuracy in the
trade-off in Equation (9). Note that the natural images are often contained in cube [0, 1]d. If ‖z‖∞ is too large to exceed the
region of natural images, the accuracy will be obviously rather poor. Note that if we use variants of Gaussian distribution,
we only need ||z||2/
√
d to be not too large. Theorem 6 says that once ‖z‖∞ is in a reasonably small scale, the maximum
distance term must be unreasonably large in high dimensions, yielding a vacuous lower bound.
Proof. First notice that the distribution of z can be factorized by the following hierarchical scheme:
a ∼ piR(a) ∝ ad−1−ke−
a2
2σ2 I{a ≥ 0}
s ∼ Unif⊗d(−1, 1)
z ← s‖s‖∞
a.
Without loss of generality, we assume δ∗ = [r, ..., r]>. (see Theorem 4)
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) = Ez∼pi0
(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
.
Notice that as the distribution is symmetry,
Ppi0 (‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r | ‖z‖∞ = a) =
1
2
.
Define |z|(i) is the i-th order statistics of |zj |, j = 1, ..., d conditioning on ‖z‖∞ = a. By the factorization above and some
algebra, we have, for any  ∈ (0, 1),
P
(
|z|(d−1)
|z|(d)
> (1− ) | ‖z‖∞ = a
)
≥ 1− (1− )d−1.
And |z|
(d−1)
|z|(d) ⊥ |z|
(d). Now we estimate DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗).
Ez∼pi0
(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
=EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a
]
=
1
2
EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r
]
+
1
2
EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ 6= a+ r
]
.
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Conditioning on ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r, we have
piδ
pi0
(z) =
(
1
1 + ra
)k
e−
1
2σ2
(2ra+r2)
=
(
1
1 + ra
)k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
(2 ar+1).
Here the second equality is because we choose mode(‖z‖∞) = Cr, which implies that
√
d− 1− kσ = Cr. And thus we
have
EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r
]
=
∫ (
λ−
(
1
1 + ra
)k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
(2 ar+1)
)
+
pi(a)da
=
∫ (
λ−
(
1 +
r
a
)−k (
e
2a/r+1
2C2
)−(d−1−k))
+
pi(a)da
=λ−O(t−d),
for some t > 1. Here the last equality is by the assumption that ‖z‖∞ = Op(1).
Next we bound the second term EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδpi0 (z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ 6= a+ r
]
. By the property of uniform
distribution, we have
P
(
|z|(d−1)
|z|(d)
> (1− ) | ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ 6= a+ r
)
=P
(
|z|(d−1)
|z|(d)
> (1− ) | ‖z‖∞ = a
)
≥1− (1− )d−1.
And thus, for any  ∈ [0, 1),
P
(
‖z + δ∗‖∞ ≥ ((1− )a+ r)2 | ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ 6= a+ r
)
≥ 1
2
(
1− (1− )d−1) .
It implies that
Ez∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r
]
≥1
2
(
1− (1− )d−1)(λ− (1− + r
a
)−k
e−
1
2σ2
((−2)a2+2r(1−)a+r2)
)
+
=
1
2
(
1− (1− )d−1)(λ− (1− + r
a
)−k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
((−2)a2/r2+2(1−)a/r+1)
)
+
.
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For any ′ ∈ (0, 1), by choosing  = log(2/′)d−1 , for large enough d, we have
Ez∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ = a+ r
]
≥1
2
(
1− (1− )d−1)(λ− (1− + r
a
)−k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
(2(1−)a/r+1)e
a2 log(2/′)
C2r2
)
+
=
1
2
(
1− (1− log(2/
′)
d− 1 )
d−1
)(
λ−
(
1− log(2/
′)
d− 1 +
r
a
)−k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
(2(1−)a/r+1)e
a2 log(2/′)
C2r2
)
+
≥1
2
(1− ′)
(
λ−
(
1− + r
a
)−k
e−
d−1−k
2C2
(2(1−)a/r+1)e
a2 log(2/′)
C2r2
)
+
.
Thus we have
1
2
EaEz∼pi0
[(
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
| ‖z‖∞ = a, ‖z + δ∗‖∞ 6= a+ r
]
=
1
2
(1− ′) (λ−O(t−d)) .
Combine the bounds, for large d, we have
DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ∗) = (1− ′)
(
λ−O(t−d)) .
B. Practical Algorithm
In this section, we give our algorithm for certification. Our target is to give a high probability bound for the solution of
Lpi0(F[0,1], B`∞,r) = max
λ≥0
{
λf ]pi0 − DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
}
given some classifier f ]. Following Cohen et al. (2019), the given classifier here has a binary output {0, 1}. Computing the
above quantity requires us to evaluate both f ]pi0 and DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ). A lower bound pˆ0 of the former term is obtained
through binominal test as Cohen et al. (2019) do, while the second term can be estimated with arbitrary accuracy using Monte
Carlo samples. We perform grid search to optimize λ and given λ, we draw N i.i.d. samples from the proposed smoothing
distribution pi0 to estimate λf ]pi0 − DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ). This can be achieved by the following importance sampling manner:
λf ]pi0 − DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
≥ λpˆ0 −
∫ (
λ− piδ
pi0
(z)
)
+
pi0(z)dz
≥ λpˆ0 − 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
λ− piδ
pi0
(zi)
)
+
− .
And we use reject sampling to obtain samples from pi0. Notice that, we restrict the search space of λ to a finite compact
set so the importance samples is bounded. Since the Monte Carlo estimation is not exact with an error , we give a high
probability concentration lower bound of the estimator. Algorithm 1 summarized our algorithm.
Black-Box Certification with Randomized Smoothing: A Functional Optimization Based Framework
Algorithm 1 Certification algorithm
Input: input image x0; original classifier: f ]; smoothing distribution pi0; radius r; search interval [λstart, λend] of λ; search
precision h for optimizing λ; number of samples N1 for testing p0; pre-defined error threshold ; significant level α;
compute search space for λ : Λ =range(λstart, λend, h)
compute N2: number of Monte Carlo estimation given , α and Λ
compute optimal disturb: δ depends on specific setting
for λ in Λ do
sample z1, · · · , zN1 ∼ pi0
compute n1 = 1N1
∑N1
i=1 f
](x0 + zi)
compute pˆ0 =LowerConfBound(n1, N1, 1− α)
sample z1, · · · , zN2 ∼ pi0
compute DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) = 1N2
∑N2
i=1
(
λ− piδpi0 (zi)
)
+
compute confidence lower bound bλ = λpˆ0 − DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)− 
end
if maxλ∈Λ bλ ≥ 1/2 then
x0 can be certified
else
x0 cannot be certified
end
The LowerConfBound function performs a binominal test as described in Cohen et al. (2019). The  in Algorithm 1 is given
by concentration inequality.
Theorem 7. Let h(z1, · · · , zN ) = 1N
∑N
i=1
(
λ− piδ(zi)pi0(zi)
)
+
, we yield
Pr{|h(z1, · · · , zN )−
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz| ≥ ε} ≤ exp
(−2Nε2
λ2
)
.
Proof. Given McDiarmid’s Inequality, which says
sup
x1,x2,...,xn,xˆi
|h (x1, x2, . . . , xn)− h (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xˆi, xi+1, . . . , xn)| ≤ ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we have ci = λN , and then obtain
Pr{|h(z1, · · · , zN )−
∫
(λpi0(z)− piδ(z))+ dz| ≥ ε} ≤ exp
(−2Nε2
λ2
)
.
The above theorem tells us that, once , λ,N is given, we can yield a bound with high-probability 1− α. One can also get
N when , λ, α is provided. Note that this is the same as the Hoeffding bound mentioned in Section 4.2 as Micdiarmid
bound is a generalization of Hoeffding bound.
However, in practice we can use a small trick as below to certify with much less comupation:
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Algorithm 2 Practical certification algorithm
Input: input image x0; original classifier: f ]; smoothing distribution pi0; radius r; search interval for λ: [λstart, λend]; search
precision h for optimizing λ; number of Monte Carlo for first estimation: N01 , N
0
2 ; number of samples N1 for a
second test of p0; pre-defined error threshold ; significant level α; optimal perturbation δ (δ = [r, 0, . . . , 0]> for `2
attacking and δ = [r, . . . , r]> for `∞ attacking).
for λ in Λ do
sample z1, · · · , zN01 ∼ pi0
compute n01 =
1
N01
∑N01
i=1 f
](x0 + zi)
compute pˆ0 =LowerConfBound(n01, N
0
1 , 1− α)
sample z1, · · · , zN02 ∼ pi0
compute DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) = 1N02
∑N02
i=1
(
λ− piδpi0 (zi)
)
+
compute confidence lower bound bλ = λpˆ0 − DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
end
compute λˆ = arg maxλ∈Λ bλ
compute N2: number of Monte Carlo estimation given , α and λˆ
sample z1, · · · , zN1 ∼ pi0
compute n1 = 1N1
∑N1
i=1 f
](x0 + zi)
compute pˆ0 =LowerConfBound(n1, N1, 1− α)
sample z1, · · · , zN2 ∼ pi0
compute DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) = 1N2
∑N2
i=1
(
λ− piδpi0 (zi)
)
+
compute b = λˆpˆ0 − DˆF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)− 
if b ≥ 1/2 then
x0 can be certified
else
x0 cannot be certified
end
Algorithm 2 allow one to begin with small N01 , N
0
2 to obtain the first estimation and choose a λˆ. Then a rigorous lower
bound can be achieved with λˆ with enough (i.e. N1, N2) Monte Carlo samples.
B.1. Experiment Settings
The details of our method are shown in the supplementary material. Since our method requires Monte Carlo approximation,
we draw 0.1M samples from pi0 and construct α = 99.9% confidence lower bounds of that in Equation (9). The optimization
on λ is solved using grid search. For `2 attacks, we set k = 500 for CIFAR-10 and k = 50000 for ImageNet in our
non-Gaussian smoothing distribution Equation (10). If the used model was trained with a Gaussian perturbation noise of
N (0, σ20), then the σ parameter of our smoothing distribution is set to be
√
(d− 1)/(d− 1− k)σ0, such that the expectation
of the norm ‖z‖2 under our non-Gaussian distribution Equation (10) matches with the norm of N (0, σ20). For `1 situation,
we keep the same rule for hyperparameter selection as `2 case, in order to make the norm of proposed distribution has the
same mean with original distribution. The certification results of baseline might be slightly different from Teng et al. (2020)
in which the whole dataset is assessed while we follow Cohen et al. (2019) to certify a subset with 500 data points. For
`∞ situation, we set k = 250 and σ also equals to
√
(d− 1)/(d− 1− k)σ0 for the mixed norm smoothing distribution
Equation (13). More ablation study about k is deferred to Appendix C.
C. Abalation Study
On CIFAR10, we also do ablation study to show the influence of different k for the `2 certification case as shown in Table 6.
Black-Box Certification with Randomized Smoothing: A Functional Optimization Based Framework
`2 Radius 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25
Baseline (%) 60 43 34 23 17 14 12 10 8
k = 100 (%) 60 43 34 23 18 15 12 10 8
k = 200 (%) 60 44 36 24 18 15 13 10 8
k = 500 (%) 61 46 37 25 19 16 14 11 9
k = 1000 (%) 59 44 36 25 19 16 14 11 9
k = 2000 (%) 56 41 35 24 19 16 15 12 9
Table 6. Certified top-1 accuracy of the best classifiers on cifar10 at various `2 radius. We use the same model as Cohen et al. (2019) and
do not train any new models.
D. Illumination about Bilateral Condition2
The results in the main context is obtained under binary classfication setting. Here we show it has a natural generalization to
multi-class classification setting. Suppose the given classifier f ] classifies an input x0 correctly to class A, i.e.,
f ]A(x0) > max
B 6=A
f ]B(x0) (14)
where f ]B(x0) denotes the prediction confidence of any class B different from ground truth label A. Notice that f
]
A(x0) +∑
B 6=A f
]
B(x0) = 1, so the necessary and sufficient condition for correct binary classification f
]
A(x0) > 1/2 becomes a
sufficient condition for multi-class prediction.
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient condition for correct classification of the smoothed classifier is
min
f∈F
{
Ez∼pi0 [fA(x0 + δ + z)] s.t. Epi0 [fA(x0)] = f ]pi0 ,A(x0)
}
>
max
f∈F
{
Ez∼pi0 [fB(x0 + δ + z)] s.t. Epi0 [fB(x0)] = f ]pi0 ,B(x0)
}
for ∀B 6= A and any perturbation δ ∈ B. Writing out their Langragian forms makes things clear:
max
λ
λf ]pi0 ,A(x0)− DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ) > minλ maxB 6=Aλf
]
pi0 ,B
(x0) + DF[0,1] (piδ ‖ λpi0)
Thus the overall necessary and sufficient condition is
min
δ∈B
{
max
λ
(
λf ]pi0 ,A(x0)− DF[0,1] (λpi0 ‖ piδ)
)
−max
B 6=A
min
λ
(
λf ]pi0 ,B(x0) + DF[0,1] (piδ ‖ λpi0)
)}
> 0
Optimizing this bilateral object will theoretically give a better certification result than our method in main context, especially
when the number of classes is large. But we do not use this bilateral formulation as reasons stated below.
When both pi0 and piδ are gaussian, which is Cohen et al. (2019)’s setting, this condition is equivalent to:
min
δ∈B
{
Φ
(
Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,A(x0))−
‖δ‖2
σ
)
−max
B 6=A
Φ
(
Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,B(x0)) +
‖δ‖2
σ
)}
> 0
⇔ Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,A(x0))−
r
σ
> Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,B(x0)) +
r
σ
, ∀B 6= A
⇔ r < σ
2
(
Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,A(x0))− Φ−1(f ]pi0 ,B(x0))
)
,∀B 6= A
with a similar derivation process like Appendix A.3. This is exactly the same bound in the (restated) theorem 1 of Cohen
et al. (2019).
Cohen et al. (2019) use 1−pA as a naive estimate of the upper bound of f ]pi0 ,B(x0), where pA is a lower bound of f ]pi0 ,A(x0).
This leads the confidence bound decay to the bound one can get in binary case, i.e., r ≤ σΦ−1(f ]pi0 ,A(x0)).
As the two important baselines (Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) do not take the bilateral form, we also do not use
this form in experiments for fairness.
2In fact, the theoretical part of Jia et al. (2020) share some similar discussion with this section.
